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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5256
Conditional cash transfers are being heralded as effective 
tools against the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty. There is substantial evidence on the positive 
effects of these transfers. Analysts are only now beginning 
to investigate the indirect effects these programs generate. 
This paper examines the effect of a gender-targeted 
conditional cash transfer program on the time allocation 
of mothers in rural program-eligible households. Using 
a fixed effects difference-in-differences estimator, the 
This paper—a product of the  Poverty and Gender Group, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector of the 
Latin America and Caribbean Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to evaluate the full range of impacts 
social programs produce. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
author may be contacted at ahasan1@worldbank.org.  
author finds that program eligibility is associated with an 
increase of 120 minutes of housework per typical school 
day by mothers of eligible children in the stipend district 
when compared with mothers of eligible children in the 
non-stipend district. There is a 100-minute reduction 
in the amount of time mothers report spending on 
children’s needs. The intent-to-treat effect of the program 
suggests no change in the amount of time spent on paid 
work or sleep. 
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I.  Introduction 
Over the course of the last decade conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have 
become a popular policy instrument in combating the inter-generational transmission of poverty. 
As the name suggests these programs entail transferring cash to beneficiaries provided they alter 
their behavior according to pre-defined conditions. Typically these conditions relate to human 
capital investments in children. Consequently, this policy instrument is seen as tackling poverty 
in the current generation via the transfer and in the subsequent generations via increased human 
capital investments in children. 
The heightened excitement in policymaking circles stems in large part from a substantial 
body of active academic research which suggests that these programs are an effective means of 
increasing human capital investments in children. This research has been instrumental in 
updating existing programs and in refining new ones. However, much less is known about the 
unintended consequences these programs might have. It is particularly important for this gap to 
be filled as new programs are introducing new forms of targeting. The focus of the present paper 
is the use of gender-targeting to determine program eligibility. 
It is well-documented that in rural households, school-age girls are extensively engaged 
in household chores.
1 When conditional cash transfer programs are implemented in rural areas 
and girls take up the chance to go to school, it stands to reason that they have less time to spend 
on work around the house. This raises the following question: who does the work these girls 
would have been doing in the absence of the program? Does the household respond by allocating 
chores to a different sibling or does the mother adjust her time allocation? A complete 
                                                            
1 Levison et. al. (2001) and Ersado (2002) show that workloads are heavier for girls than for boys according to a 
range of definitions of work and in a multitude of regional and national settings. See also the evidence presented in 
Cynthia B. Lloyd et. al., 2008 and the references cited therein.  3 
 
understanding of these kinds of spillover effects of conditional cash transfer programs is vital if 
their success is to be sustained. 
This paper examines how the mother’s time allocation responds when a gender-targeted 
CCT program increases the enrollment of girls, reducing their supply of labor in the household. I 
review the literature in section II. Section III describes the program and section IV describes the 
data. In section V, I supplement the existing evaluation of the program in question with 
descriptive evidence of the effects of the program on student enrollment discernible in the data. I 
do so in order to establish that the changes in household time allocation are in fact a spillover 
effect of the CCT program and not a statistical artifact of the data (or sample construction). In 
section VI, I lay out the empirical strategy and the identification issues associated with the main 
analysis of the paper – estimating changes in household time allocation. The findings are 
subjected to a series of alternative specifications and robustness checks in Section VII. Section 
VIII concludes with a discussion of the findings and their relevance for policymakers. 
II. Literature Review 
The prototypical CCT program – or at least the most well-known – is Mexico’s 
Oportunidades program (formerly Progresa). In part, the literature focuses on this program 
because it was implemented as a randomized experiment and detailed baseline and follow-up 
data was collected on both treatment and control group villages. Consequently there exist a host 
of evaluations of Progresa which utilize data from the randomized experiment and supplement 
their findings with results from regression-adjusted difference-in-difference estimators. Parker et 
al. (2008) provides an up-to-date and in-depth review of the state of the literature. Therefore, in 
this paper I only provide a brief overview of the strand of the literature relevant to the current 
analysis and then turn to program details.  4 
 
In Table 1, I provide summary descriptions of the kinds of transfer programs that have 
been implemented in a number of countries. I limit the table to programs that have a condition 
relating to educational investments.
2 The most common condition is enrollment and a minimum 
level of attendance. Most programs are targeted explicitly to the children of poor households and 
most have payment schedules that vary based on schooling level or grade.  
The Progresa program has been evaluated on a range of outcomes: enrollment (Schultz, 
2000 and 2004), labor force participation (Skoufias and Parker, 2001), morbidity, height, 
prevalence of anemia (Gertler, 2004), food consumption (Hoddinott and Skoufias, 2004), intra-
household allocation of expenditure (Martinelli and Parker, 2008), and investment behavior 
(Gertler et. al. 2006). The effectiveness of Progresa is well-documented along virtually all of 
these dimensions. Subsequent evaluations on the schooling effects of Progresa have sought to 
identify how the effects of the program vary: via endogenous peer effects (Bobonis and Finan 
2006), via within family effects (Parker et. al. 2005) and family network effects (Angelucci et. al. 
2008). Similarly, Maluccio and Flores (2004) find increases in food expenditures, school 
enrollment, nutritional status and participation in health care in their evaluation of Nicaragua’s 
Red de Protección Social program. 
 Only a few conditional cash transfer programs are explicitly targeted solely to girls. Of 
particular relevance to the current analysis are the programs in Cambodia, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. In each of these countries, policymakers have explicitly targeted the transfer on the 
basis of gender – providing transfers to girls only. Using repeated cross-sectional data, Khandker 
et al. (2003) find that the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Assistance Program led to a 
substantial increase in the enrollment of girls and found no spillover effect for boys.  Filmer and 
                                                            
2 This list of programs is not intended to be exhaustive. Some of the programs reported in this Table also have 
health-related conditions not reported here. More detailed reviews of programmatic details can be found in Todd, 
2009. 5 
 
Schady (2006), exploiting the cut-off score used to determine eligibility for Cambodia’s Japan 
Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) scholarship, find a 30 to 43 percentage point increase in the 
enrollment and attendance of girls. Chaudhury and Parajuli (2006; 2008) use repeated school 
censuses in conjunction with a district-level eligibility cut-off and find that Pakistan’s female 
student stipend program in Punjab between 2003 and 2005 increased enrollment by six female 
students per school (a nine percent increase in female enrollment in terms of relative change). 
In the context of gender-targeted transfers such as these, a natural question arises: when 
these girls go to school, who takes care of the work within the household they had been doing? 
Answers to this question are absent in the literature because often analysts do not have access to 
the right kind of data. The evaluations described above have either had to rely on administrative 
(Filmer and Schady, 2006) or school level (Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2006; 2008) data or on 
household data where no information is typically available on time use (Khandker et. al. 2003). 
An answer to this question is, however, particularly relevant as new programs are brought on-
line and existing ones are expanded. Skoufias and Parker (2000 and 2001) shed some light on the 
time use of recipient households under Progresa. Their insights on the issue were, however, 
necessarily limited because time use data was only available to them for one post-program year.
3 
Consequently, this paper has a modest goal: to build on this earlier work and to provide a more 
complete picture of the effects of a gender-targeted conditional cash transfer program on the time 
allocation of rural households. 
 
                                                            
3 See also the evidence in George and Schechter (2009) on issues of data quality in the Progresa data. 6 
 
III. Program 
As part of the government of Pakistan’s commitment to the reduction of gender disparity 
in education, it initiated a conditional cash transfer program targeted to female students in 
Punjab. Under the program girls receive a stipend of Rs. 200 per month (approximately US$ 3.5) 
if they are enrolled in grades 6 to 8 in a government school and maintain a minimum attendance 
of 80 percent. The stipend is paid in quarterly payments to the student via a postal money order. 
To give this amount context, consider that a day’s unskilled wage for a male in these areas is 
estimated to be Rs. 60. Thus an unskilled male who works 30 days a month can expect to receive 
Rs. 1800 a month. The stipend, then, amounts to one-ninth of the average monthly income for an 
unskilled worker. 
The program was announced in the last quarter of 2003. The government did not consider 
randomization politically feasible and therefore used district-level literacy rates for the 
population aged 10 and over according to the 1998 census (the most recent census at the time) to 
determine which districts would be eligible to receive the stipend program. Districts with literacy 
levels below 40 percent were deemed eligible. Those with literacy rates higher than 40 percent 
were ineligible. These districts and their literacy rates are reported in Table 2. Implementation of 
the program reportedly did not begin in full until the second quarter of 2004. 
IV. Data 
The data used in this paper come from three waves of the Learning and Educational 
Achievement in Punjab Schools (LEAPS) survey which was conducted in 112 villages of the 
Punjab province of Pakistan. The villages are located in Faisalabad (center), Rahim Yar Khan 
(south) and Attock (north) districts. Sample villages were randomly chosen from a list of villages 
with at least one private school according to the 2000 census of private schools. The survey 7 
 
covered all 823 government and private schools that offer primary level education in these 
villages. In addition, the survey interviewed and followed a random sample of 1,807 households 
in these villages for four years. 
Under the rules of the program, households in Attock and Faisalabad districts (henceforth 
comparison districts) are ineligible to receive the stipend while those in Rahim Yar Khan district 
(henceforth the treatment district) may be stipend-eligible if they have a girl enrolled in grades 6, 
7 or 8 in a public school. Detailed time use data were collected on the mothers in these 
households in 2004, 2006 and 2007. The time use module collects information on a range of 
activities including time spent on housework, paid work, looking after children’s needs and 
sleep.
4 Respondents were asked to recall the amount of time they spend in various activities in a 
24-hour period on a typical school day.  
From among the 1807 households surveyed, I identify 603 mothers of children eligible 
for the stipend program, of which 541 provide time use data.
5  I exclude from the analysis 59 
mothers who either gave reports of time use that exceeded 24-hours or were missing information 
on key items.
6 The remaining 482 mothers comprise the sample with which the main analysis in 
this paper is conducted. In addition to household data from the LEAPS survey, I briefly present 
evidence from the school surveys conducted by the LEAPS team as well as some supporting 
                                                            
4 Other activities on which data was collected include: school shopping, children’s studies, prayer, entertainment and 
a catch-all category – other. 
5 A household is deemed to have an eligible child if the child is a girl who reports being enrolled in any of the 
following grades: grade 6, 7 or 8. Given the small size of the sample, I pool observations from both stipend-
ineligible districts into a unitary comparison group. I run the comparisons between treatment and the two 
comparison districts separately in sensitivity checks. 
6 For the purposes of the analysis presented below, I treat 2004 as a pre-program year. In what follows it is referred 
to as round 1 of the survey. 2005 (round 2) is the first year of the program but for this year no time use data was 
collected from adults. 2006 (round 3) represents the first post-program year and 2007 (round 4) represents the 
second post-program year. In round 1, 44 eligible households report more than 24 hours of time use. 11 households 
are from Attock, 15 from Faisalabad and 10 from Rahim Yar Khan. In round 3, 38 eligible households report more 
than 24 hours of time use. 13 are from Attock, 15 from Faisalabad and 10 from Rahim Yar Khan. In round 4, 25 
eligible households report more than 24 hours of time use. 5 are from Attock, 13 are from Faisalabad and 7 are from 
Rahim Yar Khan. 8 
 
evidence from administrative data shared by the Project Management Implementation Unit 
(PMIU) of the Punjab Education Sector Reform Project (PERSP). Lastly, I use data from the 
nationally representative cross-sectional household survey – the 2004-2005 Pakistan Social and 
Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) to support some of the assumptions made in the 
empirical analyses that follow. 
V.  Evidence of program impact on child enrollment  
The main question this paper seeks to answer is how the stipend causes time allocation in 
recipient households to change. In order for any changes to be attributable to the stipend 
program, the program must be having an effect on girls’ enrollment to begin with. The LEAPS 
household surveys did not ask respondents to report the grade in which they were enrolled at 
baseline.
7 This is problematic because in the absence of a self-report imputing the grade at 
baseline would necessitate making a very particular set of assumptions. For instance, one might 
assume that education in Pakistan begins at age six. Then, assuming further that there is no grade 
repetition or dropout everyone who began school at this age should be in grade six by age 
twelve, grade seven by age thirteen and grade eight by age fourteen. Neither of these 
assumptions is very plausible given what is known about educational trajectories of children 
from developing countries in general and Pakistan in particular. Similarly, if I were to subtract 
the number of years since baseline from the grade reported in subsequent rounds, I would be 
forced to assume that no one dropped out and that no one repeated a grade. Both of these 
                                                            
7 It is important to remember throughout this paper that the LEAPS survey was not fielded to evaluate the stipend 
program. Thus there are some limitations in the data that necessitate particular (some might say peculiar) 
assumptions as the analysis progresses. To the extent possible I will justify the choices using evidence from the 
PSLM data. The program seeks to increase enrollment in grades 6-8 for girls in public schools. 9 
 
assumptions seem baseless given the evidence.
8 Therefore it is not possible to know from the 
household surveys if enrollment in particular grades increased over time.  
In addition, the rules of the stipend do not state that girls must be of the correct age-for-
grade in order to receive the stipend. Thus in order to check if there is a change in the enrollment 
patterns of children in the treatment district, I compare the enrollment probabilities over time of 
10-14 year old girls in the treatment district with 10-14 year old girls in the comparison districts. 
I make the choice of 10-14 year olds on the grounds that it is the same age range as chosen by 
Chaudhury and Parajuli (2006, 2008) in their evaluation of the program and because an 
inspection of the age-grade profile from the PSLM 2004 (see Figure 1) suggests that girls in this 
age range are predominantly enrolled in grades 6 through 8.
9 
Having verified the appropriateness of focusing on 10 to 14 year-old girls, I examine how 
the enrollment probabilities for these girls change over time in the treatment and comparison 
district households in the LEAPS data. Consistent with the targeting criterion of the stipend 
program and with existing evidence of the effects of the program, girls in the treatment district 
are significantly less likely to be attending a public school at baseline (Figure 2).
10 The average 
probability of attending a public school for 10 to 14 year old girls is 0.36 for the treatment 
district and 0.46 for the comparison district. This 10 percentage point difference at baseline is 
significant – both statistically and in magnitude. The gap narrows over time but continues to be 
statistically significant in rounds 2 and 3. In round 4, there is no statistically distinguishable 
difference between girls in the treatment and comparison districts. This difference in trends 
                                                            
8 See for instance Holmes, 1999. 
9 This figure reinforces the point about schooling trajectories made earlier. 
10 The figure plots sample averages for the treatment and comparison groups along with the associated confidence 
intervals. 10 
 
suggests that the stipend program discourages girls from dropping out in the treatment district at 
the same rates as they are dropping out in the comparison district. 
The drop-off in attendance as implied by the steepness of the slopes shown in Figure 2 is 
larger for girls in the comparison districts than it is for girls in the treatment districts. As a 
placebo test, I repeat the exercise for girls’ enrollment in private schools (Figure 3). I find that 
there is no differential change in the attendance probability for girls in private schools. This is to 
be expected if the stipend program did not induce parents to switch from private to public 
schools. There has been no evidence to date of this having occurred. Taken together, Figures 2 
and 3 suggest that over time girls who reside in the treatment district and are in the typical age-
range for grades 6 through 8 seem to be attending public schools at a higher rate over time than 
similar girls in the comparison district. 
I next use the data from the school surveys conducted by the LEAPS team to plot the 
percent of all students who drop out over the course of the LEAPS survey. Figure 4 shows the 
dropout rate for children in public schools. Over the course of the survey period the drop-out rate 
from public schools in the comparison districts is fairly stable at 6 percent. In contrast, the drop-
out rate clearly falls over time in the treatment district from 5 percent (at which point it is 
statistically indistinguishable from the dropout rate in the comparison districts) to 2 percent 
(which is statistically different). Again, to provide evidence that the changes in public schools 
are likely the results of the stipend program, I also plot dropout rates for private schools (Figure 
5). There is no difference between treatment and comparison districts in the level or trend in 
drop-out rates from private schools. The confidence intervals for private schools in the treatment 
and comparison districts overlap everywhere. Figures 4 and 5 together suggest that there is no 
difference at baseline in dropout rates between public schools in the treatment and comparison 11 
 
districts. They also suggest that a difference in drop-out rates emerges over time for public 
schools and that a similar difference is not present in the data on private schools. 
Both of the preceding pieces of evidence suggest that the female student stipend program 
appears to be having an effect in the treatment district relative to the comparison districts. 
Admittedly, each piece has its own limitations and these results do not constitute a 
comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of the program as a whole. They do, however, 
provide some evidence regarding the channels through which the program appears to be 
operating – a slowdown in the attrition rate from public schools for girls in the treatment district. 
In order to more convincingly establish that this is the case, I conduct a more stringent test by 
comparing the difference in outcomes   between individuals   and    in family   at time   in the 
treatment district with this difference for families in the comparison district. I estimate the 
following model: 
                 
         
          
      
           
      
   
 
   
            
(1) 
which assumes that the error term can be decomposed as follows:   
                   (1a) 
The term    represents the effects of unobservables that vary across families but are constant for 
individuals within the same family and      terms are independently and identically distributed. I 
define two indicator functions:   
  which denotes whether or not individual   is a female and  
   
    which denotes whether or not family   resides in the treatment district. Intuitively, I take 
differences between a girl and a boy (  and   ) in the same family and compare how this 
difference evolves over time     for families in the treatment district relative to how it evolves 
for families in the comparison districts. I am able to do this for three post-program periods.  12 
 
I implement this as follows. I remove from the LEAPS sample households where all the 
children are boys (106 households) or households where all the children are girls (75 
households).  These households are not informative for the comparison performed here. I then 
enter dummy variables for the interaction between households and years. Standard errors are 
clustered by individual to allow for the correlation of observations from the same individuals 
over time. The coefficients of interest are the interactions between gender of the child, whether 
or not the family is in the treatment district and whether or not the data are from post-program 
rounds    ,          . In Table 3, I report the results from this within family difference-in-
differences estimator. As suggested above, the point estimates are positive and increase over 
time from practically (and statistically) no difference in the first post-program year to a one 
percentage point difference and then a statistically significant three percentage point difference 
over the course of the LEAPS survey. 
The evidence in Table 3 suggests that by round 4 of the LEAPS survey, female children 
in the treatment district are roughly 3 percentage points more likely to be attending public 
schools than their male siblings relative to those in the comparison districts. Models that control 
for characteristics of the individual are similar and insensitive to choice of specification used.
11 
VI. Evidence of program impact on household time allocation 
Having provided several pieces of evidence which suggest that the stipend program 
influenced girls’ enrollment, I turn to the main question posed at the outset of this paper: Do 
households reallocate time use when conditional cash transfers are provided to them? To answer 
it, I employ a standard difference-in-difference approach, briefly explained below. 
Consider the stylized example depicted in Figure 6. Data are available on an outcome ( ) 
for households from two groups – those eligible for treatment (     ) and those ineligible for 
                                                            
11 A series of indicators for age or a cubic specification in age provide the same results. 13 
 
treatment        . The vertical dashed line at time t represents the implementation of the 
program. Consequently t-1 is the baseline period and t+1 is the post-program period. Outcomes 
for two groups are shown: the comparison group (solid grey line) and the treated group (solid 
black line). The dotted line AB represents no change in the outcome of interest over time. The 
solid grey line AC represents the evolution of the outcome of the comparison group over time. 
Consequently, the distance BC is the natural trend in the outcome over time that would exist in 
the absence of any program. Without such information from a comparison group, the effect of 
the program would be overstated. Likewise, the line DEF shows how the outcome for the treated 
group would have evolved in the absence of the program.
12 The difference between the two 
groups at baseline (the distance AD) is assumed to have persisted (the distance CF is drawn to 
equal the distance AD). However, the implementation of policy causes the outcome for the 
treated group to evolve differently. Consequently, the outcome for the treated group follows the 
path GH after the program is implemented. Using the difference-in-differences methodology 
allows the decomposition of outcomes over time into a part due to a natural trend over time 
(BC), a part due to pre-existing differences between the two groups (CF) and the part that is due 
to the program (FH). 
The data reveal that in districts where there is no stipend program, on average parents are 
more likely to send their children to school. When these children are at school, they do not help 
around the house. Consequently any housework is done by the mother or siblings who are old 
enough to help out and not in school. As they grow older and reach the end of class five – the 
end of the primary cycle in Pakistan – these children typically drop out of school. Once they 
have done so they are unlikely to return to school. Such children are again in a position to help 
                                                            
12 The segment DE is known and the segment EF is a counterfactual assumption. The choice of a positively trending 
outcome in this figure is completely arbitrary and has no bearing on the intuition. 14 
 
around the house. Thus the mothers of school-going children in districts with no stipend program 
provide a picture of the typical pattern of time use in the absence of the program. In the context 
of Figure 6, they provide the information necessary to draw the line AC. While their children are 
in school, they likely report the following pattern of time use: large amounts of housework 
combined with low amounts of time spent on children’s needs. As their children drop out the 
mothers in non-stipend districts likely report smaller amounts of housework and larger amounts 
of time spent on children’s needs. At some level this is tautological. The children are now in the 
home and the mother must spend some time on their needs. Since she only has twenty-four hours 
in the day she must report spending less time in other activities. 
By contrast in the districts where the stipend program is available, children who are in 
school are likely to delay dropping out and children who would otherwise not have gone might 
start going to school. Thus their mothers are unlikely to be able to adjust their hours by 
devolving housework to children who have dropped out. Nor would they need to spend more 
time on children’s needs since these children are more likely to be in school or at least in school 
longer. Consequently, these individuals provide the information necessary to draw lines DE and 
GH. 
a.  Descriptive comparisons 
In Table 4, I apply this methodology and report sample means of the outcomes of interest 
for eligible households in both treatment and comparison group districts over time. The four 
outcomes are the amount of time spent on (i) housework, (ii) paid work, (iii) looking after 
children’s needs and (iv) sleep. The survey defines housework as time spent on cooking, 
cleaning, looking after livestock, performing unpaid non-agricultural family work outside the 
house and working on one’s own farm. Paid work is defined as time spent on farm work, looking 15 
 
after livestock, time in self-employed work, household industry (such as embroidery), or 
working as a salaried worker. Children’s needs are described as bathing or feeding.
13 Looking at 
the unadjusted difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the program, I find that there 
are differences in the time use patterns of eligible households from the treatment district relative 
to those in the comparison districts. Specifically, comparing the time use data from round 1 (the 
baseline) with the data from round 3 (one year after the program began), mothers from stipend-
eligible households in the treatment district report spending roughly 82 additional minutes per 
typical school day on housework compared to mothers from eligible households in the 
comparison districts. Similarly they report spending 30 fewer minutes on paid work, 78 fewer 
minutes on children’s needs and report getting slightly approximately 20 fewer minutes of sleep 
relative to those in the comparison districts. 
When I compare the baseline data to that from round 4, I find that the unadjusted effect of 
the program on time spent on housework, paid work and children’s needs is qualitatively and 
quantitatively unchanged and that the direction of the effect stays the same –housework goes up 
and paid work and time spent on children’s needs goes down. The effect on sleep stays 
practically small and is now positive.
14  
b.  Methodology 
In order to see if these trends are robust to the inclusion of controls, I estimate the 
following empirical specification: 
                                                            
13 The questionnaire seems to imply that surveyors suggested the following definition of children’s needs to the 
respondent “bathing/feeding etc.” Looking after child’s studies and sickness are separate categories. 
14 When I examine the additional activities respondents report, I find that the net change in activities balances out. 
For instance,  if the unadjusted difference in difference suggests that mothers worked 2 more hours in the house and 
reduced their paid work and the time they spend on children’s needs by 3 hours, the remaining difference of 1 hour 
is recouped across the remaining activities. 16 
 
                                                                                 
 
   
  (2)
Where      is the time spent by mother   at time   in a given activity (housework, paid 
work, child needs or sleep), the vector     is a set of her observable characteristics, the terms    
and    are indicator variables for rounds 3 and 4 of the LEAPS survey. The coefficient    
captures the effect of the program one year after program implementation and the coefficient    
captures the effect of the program two years after program implementation. Given that I estimate 
this relationship using the subsample of eligible households in both treatment and control 
districts, these two coefficients represent the intent-to-treat effect of the program. The term    
reflects an individual fixed effect and incorporates the influence of time-invariant regressors – 
measured and unmeasured – on mother’s time use.
15 
c.  Results 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, I first examine the extensive margin – whether the fraction 
of mother’s who report participating in housework changes differentially across treatment and 
comparison samples. I compare mothers from households with eligible girls in the treatment 
district with mothers from households with eligible girls in the comparison districts. Column 1 
ignores the availability of panel data and presents results from pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression. Column 2 allows for a fixed effect at the level of the mother – the unit of 
analysis in this table. In both cases there is no difference over time in the fraction of mothers 
who report spending time in household work when one compares households with eligible 
children in the treatment district and the comparison districts. The mean level of participation in 
housework at baseline is 97 percent. This suggests that any differences in the intensive margin – 
                                                            
15 This fixed effects difference-in-differences estimator is an improvement over the difference estimator employed in 
Skoufias and Parker (2001) since I am now able to adjust for pre-program differences directly and am able to 
examine if the effect persists. 17 
 
the amount of housework reported – are not the result of survey respondents becoming better at 
reporting their time use or being more likely to report housework. 
In columns 3 – 7, I find evidence to suggest that relative to the mothers of those who are 
ineligible to receive the stipend program, the mothers of those who are eligible experience an 
increase in the amount of time they spend on housework. Columns 3 and 4 contain no controls 
and report estimates from pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions respectively. In columns 5 – 
7, I introduce three sets of sequentially augmented controls– basic, extended and full. The basic 
specification controls for differences in household size and composition with a set of indicator 
variables for the number and gender of household members of various ages. I include separate 
controls for the number of men, the number of women, the number of teen  boys (ages 13 to 17), 
teen girls, preteen boys (ages 5 to 12) and preteen girls as well as the number of male and female 
infants (those children under the age of 5).  
The extended set of controls adds to the household size and composition variables a 
series of indicator variables that measure the current and relative wealth of the respondents. I 
include an index of household wealth – which is the score of the first principal component of an 
index derived from whether or not a household owns items from a list of assets.
16 The LEAPS 
survey asks households to rate their wealth relative to five years ago as well as their harvest 
relative to one year ago. Responses to both these questions were categorical and as such indicator 
variables were included to capture their inherent non-linearity. The full set of controls adds a set 
of indicators for mother and father’s age as well as indicator variables for quarter of interview. If 
some seasonal differences confound the intent to treat effects of the program, controlling for 
quarter of interview addresses this issue. 
                                                            
16 Households were asked if they owned any of the following: beds, tables, chairs, fans, sewing machines, air 
coolers, air conditioners, refrigerators, radio cassette players, TVs, VCRs, and watches. Reponses were combined 
using principal components analysis. The first principal component is a standard normal variable.  18 
 
At baseline, the average mother of a stipend-eligible child in a treatment district 
household in the LEAPS sample reports spending 516 minutes on housework on a typical school 
day. Column 7 – the specification with the full set of controls – suggests that the availability of 
the stipend program increases the amount of time mothers in stipend-eligible households spend 
on housework by approximately 100 minutes (1 hour and 40 minutes). This point estimate 
corresponds to an effect of roughly 19 percent when compared with mothers in stipend ineligible 
households.
17 This increase is the same order of magnitude regardless of whether I look at round 
3 of the LEAPS survey or round 4. I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are 
equal. Together this is evidence that the effect of the stipend program persists from one year to 
the next.  
Table 6 reports the results from a similar exercise conducted on mother’s time spent on 
paid work. In contrast to the results on housework, I find no appreciable change in the amount of 
time reported on paid work. I do find evidence of a substantial difference on the extensive 
margin however: mothers from stipend-eligible households in the treatment district are 
substantially more likely to stop reporting time spent on paid work over time when compared to 
mothers from similar households in the comparison districts. 
While housework and paid work are typically the outcomes of interest in most studies, 
Table 7 exploits the availability of detailed data in the LEAPS survey and focuses on time spent 
looking after children’s needs. As in the case of paid work, there is a substantial reduction in the 
fraction of mothers reporting time spent on children’s needs in the treatment district relative to 
the comparison districts. On average, over time mothers report spending roughly 1 hour less on 
this type of activity if they live in the treatment district than if they live in the comparison 
districts. 
                                                            
17 I divide the point estimate by the sample average at baseline and multiply by 100 to arrive at this figure. 19 
 
Table 8 shows that there is no statistical difference between treatment and control group 
households in their reported amount of sleep. The point estimates are practically small and 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus while this would seem to be one margin on which 
mother’s could adjust they do not. 
The evidence presented thus far suggests that mothers of stipend-eligible children in the 
stipend district have different trajectories of time use than mothers of similar children in the 
comparison districts. The evidence suggests that mothers spend more time on housework and 
less time on children’s needs. I find no evidence of changes in the amount of time respondents 
sleep or participate in paid work. The inclusion of controls does not explain away the effect of 
the program – which in the preferred specification is an increase of about 100 minutes per typical 
school day of housework and a reduction of 70 minutes of time spent on children’s needs. 
VII.  Robustness Checks 
One critique that could reasonably be leveled at the analysis presented thus far is the fact 
that I agglomerate two districts into one comparison group. Administrative data presented in 
figure 7, shows total female enrollment in grades 6-8 (panel a) and all grades (panel b) for all 
three districts of the LEAPS data. This figure suggests that Attock is a more appropriate 
comparison group if baseline enrollment is taken as the yardstick for comparability.  
Consequently in Tables 9 and 10, I report the results of the full specification using each 
district, Faisalabad and Attock respectively, separately as a comparison for the stipend district – 
Rahim Yar Khan.
18 These specifications include all control variables. I find that the results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. Mothers of stipend eligible children in Rahim Yar 
Khan report roughly two more hours of housework and roughly one hour and forty minutes less 
                                                            
18 I also examine if there is any evidence of systematic differences within the treatment district. I compare the 
characteristics of households with only boys in the eligible age range with those of households with girls in the 
eligible age range. I find no statistical evidence of any differences between these two groups. 20 
 
of time spent on children’s needs when compared with mothers of stipend-eligible children in 
Attock. There is little difference over time in either paid work or sleep time. An alternative 
means of interpreting the point estimates is to compare their magnitude to baseline averages for 
the sample. As reported in Table 9, the mean amount of time spent on housework reported at 
baseline is 516 minutes per typical school day. Consequently, the point estimate suggests that 
program availability is associated with a 23 percent increase in housework.
19 
As a final check, I am particularly liberal in the removal of outlying observations. I re-run 
the analysis eliminating any households that in addition to providing outlying data on their total 
time use also provided outlying observations on a particular activity. Thus if a household’s 
responses account for 24 hours correctly, but the household reports spending 18 hours a day on 
one activity – for example housework (a value that is extreme relative to the rest of the 
distribution in the data), I remove that household from the analysis. I do so for each activity 
considered in the paper. I find this does not influence the size or direction of the effects. 
The evidence thus far suggests that households of stipend eligible children in the 
treatment district have different time use profiles over time than similar households in the 
districts where there is no such program. The skeptical reader might still be concerned that what 
is being referred to here as an effect of the stipend program is in fact the result of pre-program 
differences stemming from differences in the composition of the households at baseline. If that 
were true, the effects of household composition should persist and I should see no difference 
over time in the time-use patterns of households in the treatment and comparison districts.  
At baseline, households of eligible children in the treatment district have more boys and 
fewer girls (ages 5 – 17). In addition they also have more infant children (under 5). From the 
                                                            
19 An alternative way of interpreting the output is to consider what fraction of time in the day is allocated to each 
activity. Such as analysis says that the share of the day devoted to housework increases by 0.09 and that devoted to 
children’s needs decreases by 0.07. There is no difference in shares of the day devoted to sleep and paid work 21 
 
point of view of being able to divest responsibility to their daughters, the mothers in these 
households would then appear to be over-burdened (they have “too many” boys who are not very 
productive around the house) and under-staffed (they have “too few” girls who can help out). 
When the stipend program begins operating and these girls start to attend school, the mothers in 
the treatment district have more to do as the girls have less time to help out. Another 
consequence of girls going to school is that the mother has fewer children around the house on 
whose needs a mother can report spending time on a typical school day. Such a situation should 
persist as children age and households do not respond by differentially changing their fertility. In 
analyses not reported in this paper, I investigate if there is any evidence of differential growth in 
household size between the treatment and comparison households and find no such evidence.  
VIII.  Discussion 
Relative to mothers in households that were ineligible to receive the program, mothers in 
eligible households increase the amount of time that they report on housework by about two 
hours per typical school day. Considering that the typical eligible school girl reports spending 
four hours a day in school, I account for roughly half of the time a girl is away.  This is likely 
due to two complementary reasons – the fact that an adult woman is more productive per unit 
time in the kinds of activities that fall under housework and the fact that not all the girls’ time at 
home was being spent in housework to begin with.  
The data suggest that a gender-targeted conditional cash transfer program produces 
substantial changes in household time allocation. Such changes are not the goal of this program 
but must inevitably occur when it and similar programs are successful. Are such unintended 
consequences necessarily harmful from a societal point of view? In my opinion, the answer is a 
qualified no. The qualification stems from the fact that what is missing in the present analysis is 22 
 
similarly detailed household data not only from the three districts analyzed here but also from all 
the districts in the province.
20  
In their haste to adopt a type of program that has been successful elsewhere, 
policymakers incorporated some elements (the conditionality and relative size of the transfer) but 
changed others (the targeting based on gender). If the literature on program evaluation has taught 
us anything it is that generalizing from one setting to another is at best optimistic and at worst an 
exercise doomed to failure. This seems particularly true of evaluations of programs in developing 
countries where program design and implementation frequently are found to diverge. 
Consequently policymakers in these countries should be more careful to incorporate data 
collection at baseline and at follow-up to ensure that context-specific evaluations are possible. 
The analysis presented here and existing evidence on the effects of the program suggest 
that it is successful in sending girls to school. A substantial body of evidence exists on the 
benefits to society of educating women.
21 The children of more educated mothers have better 
educational and health outcomes. Such evidence alone should justify the continuation of this 
gender-targeted stipend program – with obvious attention being paid to capacity constraints that 
are known to emerge in schools and education systems. However, an examination of data from 
the PSLM suggests another channel through which society could benefit from such programs. 
There is a stark correlation between regional levels of maternal literacy and the sex ratios of 
children within households (Figure 8). Specifically it appears that in regions with lower levels of 
literacy there is a substantially higher ratio of boys to girls. If we are to take this correlation 
seriously then it appears that in the long-run, the stipend program has the potential to impart far-
                                                            
20 The analysis presented here was made possible by the fortuitous timing with which researchers fielded a survey 
and not the result of an attempt by policymakers to adequately monitor and evaluate the program. 
21 See for instance the arguments in Schultz, 2001 on the need for governments the world over to invest more in 
girls’ education and the evidence in Andrabi et. al., 2007 on how educated girls transition from being students today 
to teachers tomorrow in the Pakistani districts studied in the present paper. 23 
 
reaching benefits to society – it could well correct this imbalance. As such, the program should 
not be abandoned in the name of expediency as has recently been the fate of policies in Pakistan. 24 
 
Table 1 
Country (Program)  Condition  Size of transfer (US$/year)*  Eligibility 
Stipend Programs for all children 





Primary School: 8 - 17 
(varies by grade) 
Children from poor households ages 8-18 
enrolled in primary, secondary or upper 
secondary school 
    Secondary School: 25 - 32 
(varies by grade and gender) 
 
    Allowances for school 
materials 
 
      
Nicaragua (RPS)  85 % attendance per 
month. (No more 
than 3 unexcused 
absences per 
month.) 
112 per household  Children aged 7 – 13 who have not 
completed grade 1- 4. 
    4.75 per child to schools   
      
Honduras (PRAF II)  Max absence of 7 
days in 3 month 
period 
58 per child   Children from poor households ages 6-12 
who have not yet completed grade 4 
    4000 per school    
           
Turkey (SSF)  Min  85% 
attendance 
85.5 for first child  Children from poor households ages 6 and 
over enrolled in grades 1-11 
    72 for second child   
    58.5 for each subsequent 
child 
 
           
Colombia (FA)  80% attendance in a 
two-month cycle 
Primary School: 54   Children from poor households ages 7-17 
enrolled in school (grades 2-11) 
    Secondary School: 81    
Stipend Programs for Girls only 
Cambodia (JFPR)  Max: 9 days in the 
year "with good 
reason" 
45  Female student enrolled in lower 
secondary school who maintains a passing 
grade 
      
Pakistan (FSSP)  80% attendance  30 per child  Female student enrolled in grades 6 - 8 in 
a government school 
           
Bangladesh (FSSAP)  Min: 75 percent of 
school days 
10-35 (varies by grade and 
type of school (government 
or non-government) 
Female student enrolled in secondary 
school in rural areas who attains 45 
percent of class-level test scores and 
remains unmarried 
* Monthly amounts converted to annual under the assumption that a typical school year lasts 9 months. Figures for 
Bangladesh computed using 1996 exchange rate (year of program start). Figures for Pakistan computed using 2004 
exchange rate (year of program start). 25 
 
Table 2 
  Literacy Ratio (Population age 10 and over) 
  Districts Census  1998 
1 Rawalpindi    71 
2 Lahore    65 
3 Jhelum    64 
4 Gujrat  62 
5 Sialkot    59 
6 Chakwal    57 
7 Gujranwala    57 
8 Narowal  53 
9 Faisalabad    52 
10  Toba Tek Singh  51 
11 Attock  49 
12 Mandhi  Bahauddin  47 
13 Sargodha    46 
14 Sahiwal  44 
15 Sheikhupura  44 
16 Mianwali  43 
17 Multan    43 
18 Hafizabad  41 
19 Khushab  41 
20 Khanewal  40 
21 Layyah  39 
22 Okara  38 
23 Jhang  37 
24 Vehari  37 
25 Kasur  36 
26 Bahawalnagar    35 
27 Pakpattan    35 
28 Bahawalpur    35 
29 Bhakkar    34 
30  Rahim Yar Khan  33 
31 Dera  Ghazi  Khan  31 
32 Lodhran    30 
33 Muzaffar  Garh  29 
34 Rajanpur  21 
The dotted line represents the literacy cutoff used by the government in 
determining program eligibility at the district level. The one highlighted 
district below the line is the treatment district in this analysis. Districts 
above the dotted line were deemed ineligible. The two districts in bold are 
control group districts in the present analysis. 26 
 
Figure 1: The Age-Grade Distribution in post-primary grades 
Each row is a different post-primary grade. Each histogram is the percent of class enrollment that 
belongs to a particular age category. Thus the figure suggests that 31.6 percent of all the girls in 
class 6 in the rural areas of Attock, Faisalabad (comparison) and Rahim Yar Khan (treatment) are 
12 years old. Similarly 52.8 percent (28.7+24.1) of the enrollment in class 7 is made up of girls 
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Figure 2: Probability of attending a public school 
Note: Thick solid line represents sample average for girls in the treatment district. Thick dashed 
line represents sample average for girls in the comparison districts. Confidence intervals are 
marked using small dashes (lower bound) and lines that alternate dashes and dots (upper bound). 
The mean enrollment levels are statistically different in rounds 1 and 2. The fall-off in attendance 
is steeper in the comparison districts than in the treatment districts. The probability of attending 
public school at baseline (round 1) is 0.36 for girls in the treatment district and 0.46 for girls in 
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Figure 3: Probability of attending a private school 
Note: Thick solid line represents sample average for girls in the treatment district. Thick dashed 
line represents sample average for girls in the comparison districts. Confidence intervals are 
marked using small dashes (lower bound) and lines that alternate dashes and dots (upper bound). 
The mean enrollment levels are statistically indistinguishable from each other in rounds 1,2 and 
3. The probability of attending a private school at baseline (round 1) is 0.11 for girls in the 
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Figure 4: Dropout rate from public schools 
Note: Thick solid line represents sample average for the treatment district. Thick dashed line 
represents sample average for the comparison districts. Confidence intervals are marked using 
small dashes (lower bound) and lines that alternate dashes and dots (upper bound). Data exist for 
all four rounds.  The y-axis is the percentage of children dropping out. The mean at baseline for 
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Figure 5: Dropout rate from private schools 
Note: Thick solid line represents sample average for the treatment district. Thick dashed line 
represents sample average for the comparison districts. Confidence intervals are marked using 
small dashes (lower bound) and lines that alternate dashes and dots (upper bound). Data exist for 
all four rounds.  The y-axis is the percentage of children dropping out. The mean at round 2 for 
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Table 3: Differences between girls and their male siblings 
  Does child attend public school 
(1) (2) 
Is Child Female  -0.006  0.011 
(0.009) (0.007) 
Is Child Female * Treatment District  -0.080***  -0.080*** 
(0.018) (0.016) 
Is Child Female * Treatment District * Year 2  0.002  0.003 
(0.013) (0.013) 
Is Child Female * Treatment District * Year 3  0.016  0.012 
(0.016) (0.015) 
Is Child Female * Treatment District * Year 4  0.035**  0.028* 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Constant 0.270***  0.021 
(0.005) (0.014) 
Number of observations  36,544  36,133 
Number of individuals  9,136  9,136 
Adjusted R2  0.174  0.413 
Family * Year Dummies  Y  Y 
Controls N  Y 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 2 includes a series of indicator variables 
for age of the child. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered to 
















Vertical dashed line at time t represents the implementation of the program. Consequently t-1 is 
the baseline period and t+1 is the post-program period. Outcomes for two groups are shown: the 
comparison group (solid grey line) and the treated group (solid black line). The dotted line AB 
represents no change in the outcome of interest over time. The solid grey line AC represents the 
evolution of the outcome of the comparison group over time. Consequently, the distance BC is 
the natural trend in the outcome over time that would exist in the absence of any program. The 
line DEF shows how the outcome for the treated group would have evolved in the absence of the 
program. The difference between the two groups at baseline (the distance AD) would have 
persisted (the distance CF is drawn to equal the distance AD). However, the implementation of 
policy causes the outcome for the treated group to evolve differently. Consequently, the outcome 
for the treated group follows the path GH after the program is implemented. Using the 
difference-in-differences methodology allows the decomposition of outcomes over time into the 
a part due to a natural trend over time (BC), a part due to pre-existing differences between the 
two groups (CF) and the part that is due to the program (FH). 
 
t-1  t 
Y1, Y0 




A  B 
E 
G 
Difference between groups in the 
absence of the program  
H 
C  D 
Natural trend in outcome 
over time 33 
 
Table 4: Unadjusted estimates 
Minutes per typical school day spent by mother on : 
All House Work  All Paid Work Children's  Needs  Sleep 
   Treated  Comparison  Δ     Treated  Comparison Δ   Treated  Comparison Δ   Treated  Comparison Δ 
Round 1 
Mean 528  603  45 29  166 55  593 579 
SD 231  207  126 116  174 93  201 137 
N 128  385 
Round 3 
Mean 475  468  82  9 23  -30  171 139  -78  643 651  -21 
SD 189  184  65 95  146 134  125 117 
N 129  397 
Round 4 
Mean 523  506  92  8 13  -22  128 134  -117  660 635  11 
SD 148  193  52 75  102 136  105 117 
N 127  374                                      
Let T denote Treated and C denote Comparison. Then for each outcome   and round  , ∆        
        
          
        
  . Treated households are from 
Rahim Yar Khan district and have at least one child who is eligible for receipt of the stipend. Comparison households are pooled from the two 
comparison group districts – Attock and Faisalabad – and have at least one child who would be eligible if the stipend program existed in those 
districts. The changes in sample size from one round to the next reflect the net effect of observations lost due to attrition from the survey and those 
lost due to missing or outlying data. Housework is defined as including unpaid work on the family farm, looking after livestock, cooking, cleaning 
and unpaid non-agricultural work outside the home. Paid work is work for pay on a farm, looking after livestock, working in household industry, 
working as a laborer or being self-employed. Children's needs are defined as bathing and feeding. Each outcome is reported as minutes spent on a 
given activity per typical school day. Housework changes are driven by changes in minutes of cooking. Paid work changes are virtually all noise as 
very few of the mothers in these households work for pay. 
 34 
 
Table 4a: Unadjusted estimates 
Fraction of mothers that reported spending  time in an activity: 
Housework  Paid Work  Children's Needs  Sleep 
Treated Comparison  ∆  Treated Comparison  ∆  Treated Comparison  ∆  Treated Comparison  ∆ 
Round 1 
Mean 0.977 0.967  0.155 0.086  0.633 0.355  0.985 0.990 
SD 0.151  0.179  0.363 0.280  0.484 0.479  0.124 0.100 
N 130  393  129 385  128 389  130 393 
Round 3 
Mean 0.985 0.985  -0.010  0.023 0.071  -0.117  0.760 0.713  -0.231  1.000 1.000  0.005 
SD 0.124  0.122  0.151 0.256  0.429 0.453  0.000 0.000 
N 130  398  129 397  129 397  130 398 
Round 4 
Mean 1.000 0.982  0.008  0.031 0.040  -0.078  0.758 0.612  -0.132  1.000 1.000  0.005 
SD 0.000  0.135  0.175 0.196  0.430 0.488  0.000 0.000 
N 128  380  127 374  128 379  128 380 
Let T denote Treated and C denote Comparison. Then for each outcome   and round  , ∆        
       
          
        
  . Treated households are from Rahim Yar Khan district and 
have at least one child who is eligible for receipt of the stipend. Comparison households are pooled from the two comparison group districts – Attock and Faisalabad – and have at 
least one child who would be eligible if the stipend program existed in those districts. The changes in sample size from one round to the next reflect the net effect of observations lost 
due to attrition from the survey and those lost due to missing or outlying data. Housework is defined as including unpaid work on the family farm, looking after livestock, cooking, 
cleaning and unpaid non-agricultural work outside the home. Paid work is work for pay on a farm, looking after livestock, working in household industry, working as a laborer or 
being self-employed. Children's needs are defined as bathing and feeding. Each outcome is reported as a binary variable equal to one if minutes spent on a given activity per typical 
school day were reported.  35 
 
Table 5: Effect of Program Availability on Mother’s Time Spent on Housework 
Minutes per typical school day mother spent on housework 
  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment District  -89.942*** 
(25.073) 
Round  3  -133.901*** -133.743*** -157.467*** -176.368*** -197.911*** 
(13.073) (13.166) (18.160) (33.311) (35.644) 
Round  4  -103.437*** -106.081*** -135.484*** -139.177*** -161.650*** 
(14.735) (14.643) (23.850) (26.232) (28.721) 
Treatment District * Round 3       111.537*** 111.051*** 106.291*** 107.095*** 101.943*** 
(27.268) (27.024) (27.668) (29.028) (29.912) 
Treatment District * Round 4        116.609***  117.421***  106.512*** 98.441*** 100.043*** 
(28.902) (29.384) (28.564) (29.117) (29.899) 
Constant  606.215*** 585.636*** 672.595*** 665.762*** 700.157*** 
    (11.083)  (7.038)  (103.884) (140.299) (137.522) 
Number of observations  1,381  1,381  1,381  1,380  1,380 
Number  of  mothers  482 482 482 482 
R2 within     0.109  0.148  0.160  0.165 
Controls None  None  Basic  Extended  Full 
p-value of F-test of   :          0.9928 0.7210 0.9390 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The mean of the dependent variable for columns 1 and 2 is 0.9688 at baseline. For columns 3 – 7 the mean of the dependent variable at 
baseline is 516 minutes/typical school day. Basic controls: a series of indicator variables that fully describe the composition of the household by age and gender. For example: an 
indicator for each number of adult men, women, teenage boys, teenage girls, pre-teen girls, pre-teen boys as well as infant boys and girls. Extended: In addition to basic 
specification includes age of mother and father as well as indicators for whether this information is missing. Includes an asset index measured as the first principal component of a 
list of 16 assets over all rounds of the data. Also includes a series of indicators for wealth status of household as measured by wealth relative to five years ago and harvest relative 
to last year. Full: In addition to extended controls a series of indicator variables for quarter in which household was interviewed. Round 3 is the first post-program year for which 
LEAPS data on this outcome is available. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the mother level. 
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Table 6: Effect of Program Availability on Mother’s Time Spent on Paid Work





Effects  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Treatment District  0.061*  16.059 
(0.037) (13.814) 
Round 3  -0.006  -0.002  -4.895  -2.395  -3.175  -12.992  -8.399 
(0.014) (0.014)  (5.805)  (5.577) (7.853)  (13.276)  (14.426) 
Round 4  -0.047***  -0.043***  -17.477***  -16.462***  -18.540*  -18.544*  -13.329 
(0.015) (0.014)  (6.419)  (6.284) (9.775)  (10.171)  (11.574) 
Treatment District * Round 3  -0.112*** -0.111***  -31.651**  -31.857**  -29.504** -25.494** -24.431* 
(0.036) (0.036) (13.014) (12.679) (12.652)  (12.623)  (12.671) 
Treatment District * Round 4  -0.080**  -0.089** -24.987*  -27.736* -25.601* -19.560 -20.136 
(0.040) (0.041) (14.334) (14.663) (15.153)  (16.053)  (16.385) 
Constant 0.085***  0.097***  30.850***  33.728***  12.186  26.776  19.433 
   (0.015)  (0.008)  (6.355)  (3.240) (63.482)  (61.741)  (63.435) 
Number of observations  1,381  1,381  1,378  1,378  1,378  1,377  1,377 
Number of mothers  482     481  481  481  481 
R2 within     0.041     0.031  0.067  0.086  0.088 
Controls None  None  None  None  Basic  Extended  Full 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The mean of the dependent variable for columns 1 and 2 is 0.1014. The mean of the dependent variable for columns 3 – 7 
at baseline is 47 minutes/typical school day. Basic controls: a series of indicator variables that fully describe the composition of the household by age and gender. 
For example: an indicator for each number of adult men, women, teenage boys, teenage girls, pre-teen girls, pre-teen boys as well as infant boys and girls. 
Extended: In addition to basic specification includes age of mother and father as well as indicators for whether this information is missing. Includes an asset 
index measured as the first principal component of a list of 16 assets over all rounds of the data. Also includes a series of indicators for wealth status of 
household as measured by wealth relative to five years ago and harvest relative to last year. Full: In addition to extended controls a series of indicator variables 
for quarter in which household was interviewed. Round 3 is the first post-program year for which LEAPS data on this outcome is available. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the mother level. 
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Table 7: Effect of Program Availability on Mother’s Time Spent on Children’s Needs 
   Did Mother 





Effects  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
    (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Treatment District  0.305***  111.115*** 
(0.053) (16.493) 
Round  3  0.376***  0.372***  78.396*** 76.911*** 93.202***  106.553***  110.813*** 
(0.033) (0.033)  (8.272)  (8.303) (12.142)  (25.956)  (27.089) 
Round  4  0.274***  0.272***  81.208*** 81.264*** 95.243*** 98.545***  105.397*** 
(0.033) (0.033)  (8.451)  (8.513) (15.759)  (17.224)  (18.870) 
Treatment District * Round 3       -0.248***  -0.241***  -76.745*** -71.170*** -71.032*** -69.756*** -69.289*** 
(0.074) (0.075)  (22.581)  (22.656) (22.401) (23.319) (23.631) 
Treatment District * Round 4       -0.189**  -0.183** -122.732*** -118.325*** -114.980*** -104.641*** -103.247*** 
(0.074) (0.075)  (21.514)  (21.752) (21.462) (21.870) (22.039) 
Constant 0.314***  0.387***  52.371***  78.502***  16.312  75.155  70.558 
   (0.025)  (0.017)  (4.947)  (4.564) (75.933)  (114.037)  (115.570) 
Number  of  observations  1,381  1,381  1,366 1,366 1,366 1,365 1,365 
Number of mothers  482     477  477  477  477 
R2 within     0.126     0.105  0.156  0.173  0.174 
Controls None  None  None  None  Basic  Extended  Full 
p-value of F-test of   :          0.0205 0.0677 0.0791 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For columns 1 and 2, the mean of the dependent variable at baseline is 0.4191. For columns 3 – 7 the mean of the dependent 
variable is 168 minutes/typical school day. Basic controls: a series of indicator variables that fully describe the composition of the household by age and gender. For 
example: an indicator for each number of adult men, women, teenage boys, teenage girls, pre-teen girls, pre-teen boys as well as infant boys and girls. Extended: In 
addition to basic specification includes age of mother and father as well as indicators for whether this information is missing. Includes an asset index measured as the 
first principal component of a list of 16 assets over all rounds of the data. Also includes a series of indicators for wealth status of household as measured by wealth 
relative to five years ago and harvest relative to last year. Full: In addition to extended controls a series of indicator variables for quarter in which household was 
interviewed. Round 3 is the first post-program year for which LEAPS data on this outcome is available. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors adjust for clustering at the mother level. 38 
 
Table 8: Effect of Program Availability on Mother’s Time Spent on Sleep 
   Minutes per typical school day spent on sleep 
  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment District  -15.331 
(17.812) 
Round 3  71.102***  70.223***  70.896***  23.815  20.666 
(9.029)  (9.146)  (14.098) (23.508) (24.424) 
Round  4  57.401*** 58.115*** 60.004*** 59.234*** 52.211*** 
(9.176)  (9.249)  (17.098) (17.805) (19.656) 
Treatment District * Round 3  0.917  -0.992  2.476  -4.202  -4.280 
(18.940) (19.137) (19.567) (20.316) (20.533) 
Treatment District * Round 4  37.231*  35.758*  40.379**  28.752  26.205 
(19.580) (19.658) (20.241) (20.947) (21.002) 
Constant  581.581*** 578.394*** 576.294*** 496.830*** 498.930*** 
    (6.964)  (4.781)  (78.223) (84.996) (84.815) 
Number  of  observations  1,354 1,354 1,354 1,353 1,353 
Number  of  mothers      473 473 473 473 
R2  within      0.107 0.121 0.148 0.150 
Controls None  None  Basic  Extended  Full 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For columns 1 and 2, the mean of the dependent variable at baseline is 0.9883. For columns 3 – 7, the mean of the 
dependent variable is 599 minutes per typical school day. Baseline controls: a series of indicator variables that fully describe the composition of the household by 
age and gender. For example: an indicator for each number of adult men, women, teenage boys, teenage girls, pre-teen girls, pre-teen boys as well as infant boys 
and girls. Extended: In addition to basic specification includes age of mother and father as well as indicators for whether this information is missing. Includes an 
asset index measured as the first principal component of a list of 16 assets over all rounds of the data. Also includes a series of indicators for wealth status of 
household as measured by wealth relative to five years ago and harvest relative to last year. Full: In addition to extended controls a series of indicator variables 
for quarter in which household was interviewed. Round 3 is the first post-program year for which LEAPS data on this outcome is available. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the mother level. 
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Figure 7: Administrative Totals – Girls Enrollment 
Panel A 
 
Source: Administrative Data.  Total enrollment figures for girls in grades 6 through 8. 
Panel B 
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Table 9: Restricting the comparison group to Faisalabad District 
Housework Paid  Work  Children's  Needs Sleep 
Treatment District 
Round 3  -162.359***  -19.493  106.590***  24.322 
(49.709) (19.982)  (37.362) (31.391) 
Round 4  -135.845***  -24.580  94.908***  44.371* 
(41.746) (17.373)  (25.434) (25.866) 
Treatment District * Round 3  134.055***  -15.927  -102.571***  -11.613 
(37.017) (15.205)  (26.502) (24.428) 
Treatment District * Round 4  126.243***  -6.079  -106.384***  -2.996 
(37.154) (21.024)  (26.474) (26.549) 
Constant 888.179***  -28.246  -11.047  549.320*** 
   (156.025)  (100.604)  (111.163)  (108.840) 
Number of observations  817  817  802  793 
Number of mothers  287  287  282  279 
R2 within  0.154  0.145  0.210  0.173 
Controls Full  Full  Full  Full 
Mean of dependent variable at baseline  522  44  166  596 
p-value of F-test of equality of coefficients  0.8175  0.4939  0.8810  0.7062 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables are measured as minutes per typical school day. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at the household level in parentheses. Full set of controls: household composition decomposes the size of the household into number of adult men, 
adult women, teen boys, teen girls, preteen boys, male infants, female infants. The number of preteen girls is entered as a series of indicator variables for up to 5 
preteen girls. The omitted category is no preteen girls. Two measures of relative wealth are asked in each round of the survey and respondents rated themselves 
as much better off, better off, about the same, worse off or much worse off. Head of household occupation indicators included indicators for livestock rearing, 
salaried job, currently not working, self-employed trader, employed skilled laborer, employed unskilled laborer. The excluded category is farming. 
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Table 10: Restricting the comparison group to Attock District 
Housework Paid  Work  Children's  Needs  Sleep 
Treatment District 
Round 3  -230.875***  -16.407  101.025***  41.593 
(51.828) (19.945)  (38.541)  (38.907) 
Round 4  -161.215***  -19.847  125.670***  72.800** 
(38.106) (13.905)  (25.939)  (28.981) 
Treatment District * Round 3  136.438***  -38.668***  -42.431  -5.502 
(34.794) (14.510)  (28.615)  (26.531) 
Treatment District * Round 4  134.650***  -32.523*  -130.848***  33.935 
(33.219) (17.946)  (25.314)  (25.781) 
Constant 399.430**  -53.993  107.181  500.097*** 
   (161.972)  (68.497)  (124.932)  (108.084) 
Number of observations  700  697  697  679 
Number of mothers  251  250  250  244 
R2 within  0.228  0.209  0.257  0.218 
Controls Full  Full  Full  Full 
Mean of dependent variable   522  44  166  596 
p-value of F-test of equality of coefficients  0.9534  0.6419  0.0002  0.0793 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables are measured as minutes per typical school day. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at the household level in parentheses. Full set of controls: household composition decomposes the size of the household into number of adult men, 
adult women, teen boys, teen girls, preteen boys, male infants, female infants. The number of preteen girls is entered as a series of indicator variables for up to 5 
preteen girls. The omitted category is no preteen girls. Two measures of relative wealth are asked in each round of the survey and respondents rated themselves 
as much better off, better off, about the same, worse off or much worse off. Head of household occupation indicators included indicators for livestock rearing, 
salaried job, currently not working, self-employed trader, employed skilled laborer, employed unskilled laborer. The excluded category is farming.
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